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Abstract
Every day, we engage in social interactions with other people which require understanding
their as well as our own mental states. Such capacity is commonly referred to as Theory of
Mind (ToM). Disturbances of ToM are often reported in diverse pathologies which affect
brain functioning and lead to problems in social interactions. Identifying ToM deficits is thus
crucial to guide the clinicians in the establishment of adequate rehabilitation strategies for
patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that ToM is not a unitary function yet currently
there are very few standardized tests which allow identifying the type of cognitive processes
affected when a patient exhibits a ToM deficit. In the current study, we present two belief
reasoning tasks which have been used in previous research to disentangle two types of pro-
cesses involved in belief reasoning: self-perspective inhibition and the spontaneous infer-
ence of another person’s belief. A three-step procedure was developed to provide clinicians
with the tools to interpret the patients’ performances on the tasks. First, these tasks were
standardized and normative data was collected on a sample of 124 healthy participants
aged between 18 and 74. Data collected showed a decrease in performance as a function of
age only in the task that loaded most in spontaneous other-perspective demands. There
was however no effect of gender or educational level. Cut-off scores to identify deficits were
then calculated for the different age groups separately. Secondly, the three-step procedure
was applied to 21 brain-damaged patients and showed a large diversity of profiles, including
selective deficits of the two targeted ToM processes. The diversity of profiles shows the
importance to take into account the multiple facets of ToM during the diagnosis and rehabili-
tation of patients with suspected ToM deficits.
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Introduction
As social beings, we constantly interact with other people around us. Such interactions require
us to reason about mental states such as beliefs, emotions and intentions in order to under-
stand and predict the behavior of others and adapt our own behavior accordingly, an ability
usually referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) [1]. ToM can be impaired following diverse psy-
chiatric and neurological pathologies which affect brain functioning such as autism [2–3],
schizophrenia [4], alcohol dependence [5], acquired focal brain lesions such as head injury or
stroke (for a review, see [6]), or neurodegenerative diseases (for a review, see [7]). Further-
more, ToM impairments generate major repercussions in the interpersonal relations of the
patients [8]. They are thus increasing appeals to improve the clinical assessment to detect ToM
deficits (see for example [9]). This is in line with the more general recognition within the fifth
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental
Disorders (DSM-5) [10], of social cognition as one of the six core neurocognitive functions to
assess.
The diagnosis of ToM deficits is currently quite challenging for different reasons. Firstly, it
is increasingly recognized that ToM is not a unitary function. For example, neuroimaging
studies have shown that ToM is sustained by a large brain network including the temporal
poles, the temporo-parietal junction, the lateral and median prefrontal cortex as well as the
posterior cingulate, with each brain region being likely to play a different contributing func-
tional role during ToM reasoning (for meta-analyses, see [11–12]) In parallel, neuropsychol-
ogy studies have demonstrated dissociations in patients’ performances across different ToM
questions/tasks, providing converging evidence that ToM is composed of different cognitive
processes that can be selectively impaired in a patient [13–14]). This highlights the necessity to
include in the diagnosis diversified tests that are able to capture the different components rele-
vant for ToM reasoning, in order to better characterize the origin of a patient’s deficit and
choose the most appropriate intervention strategy [9]. Table 1 provides examples of existing
ToM tests as a function of the ToM components that these tests assess. The components relate
to the nature of the mental state inferred (e.g., emotions, desires, intentions, beliefs) and the
types of cognitive operation that need to be applied to infer the specific mental state content.
The latter components include the distinction between the decoding of expressed mental states
and the inference of mental states from situational information. The decoding of others’ men-
tal states relies on immediately available observable cues of a person’s mental state from the
person’s facial expressions and eye gaze direction for example while the inference of mental
states relies on the inference of the impact of unfolding events for a person’s mental state [15–
16]. As we will review later, it has been recently proposed that the inference of mental states
can be further decomposed into distinguishable cognitive operations, including the inhibition
of one’s own perspective [17–18], the selection of the relevant cues in the environment [19]
and the spontaneous tracking of the other person’s perspective [20]. We clarify that the first-
perspective relates to the Self, and thus to first person ToM, and that third person perspective
refers to Other- and thus to third person ToM.
The semi-structured interviews have also been recently designed to assess different facets of
ToM (see for example, the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale [21–22]).
Secondly, only few tests have established norms (see Table 1 for examples). Normative
data collection on a representative sample of healthy participants is particularly important as
there are known inter-individual differences in ToM abilities within the healthy population
(e.g., [32–33]) which makes it difficult to establish the threshold for an individual’s task
performance to be considered as pathological. There are also reported effects of age (for a
meta-analysis, see [34]) or gender ([35–37], but see [38]) within the healthy population which
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require careful consideration of these demographic factors during the normative data
collection.
Finally, ToM tests are usually quite complex because of the very nature of ToM reasoning
which requires taking into account multiple and complex sources of information as input to
the reasoning. For example, reasoning about someone’s beliefs requires to take into account
unfolding events presented visually or verbally about what that person has and has not seen or
has being told or not over a certain period of time. Thus, the processing of the input informa-
tion usually taxes visual and attentional processes, working memory and executive function as
well as language processes which can also be affected in the patients. Impaired performance on
a ToM task may thus also be linked to diminished cognitive abilities to deal with the processing
of the input information. In those cases, the integrity of the core ToM reasoning processes can-
not be established but one may still expect difficulties in the patients’ everyday life activities
since everyday life ToM reasoning is also based on complex input information. This highlights
the importance of including control items which allow assessment of the patients’ abilities to
deal with the kind of input information necessary for ToM reasoning (see Table 1 for
examples).
One paradigm which has often been used for ToM assessment is the false belief paradigm
designed by Wimmer and Perner [39]. In the original version of the test [39], the critical false
belief story starts by describing a character’s knowledge about the state of affairs (for example,
that a chocolate bar is in the blue cupboard) and then describes a change in the state of the
world that the character does not witness (for example, that while the character is away, the
chocolate bar is displaced to the green cupboard). The test question then probes participant’s
ability to infer that the character’s belief about the state of affairs is now false (e.g., the character
wrongly thinks that the chocolate bar is still in the blue cupboard). While the false belief para-
digm has often been criticized when used as litmus test to assess the integrity of ToM abilities
Table 1. Examples of tests used in the diagnosis of ToM deficits.
Decoding Inference
Non-differentiated Differentiated
Emotions Emotion recognition tasks1 [23–24]
(N: Yes, C: No)
Desires/
Intentions
Attribution of intentions in the Comic-
Strip Task [26] (N: No, C: Yes).
Task contrasting desire and intention
reasoning [27] (N: No, C: Yes).
Beliefs Tasks based on the classical paradigm of
false beliefs [2], such as the ToM-152[28]
(N: Yes, C: Yes)
Tasks reported in the current article and distinguishing self-
perspective inhibition and spontaneous other-perspective
taking.
The Nosy Neighbor Task [19]. distinguishing self-perspective
inhibition and the inhibition of distracting information in the
environment (N: No, C: Yes)
Mixed
mental states
Reading the Mind in The Eyes Test
[25] (N: Yes, C: No); Yoni Task [14]
(N: No, C: Yes);
Faux-Pas Test [29] (N: Yes, C: Yes)
Strange Stories [30–31] (N: Yes, C: Yes)
Decoding = the person’s mental state can be read out by immediately observable cues (e.g. facial expression); Inference = the person’s mental state is derived from the
impact of unfolding events for that person; N = Norms, C = Control items or questions. Control items and questions do not involve the inference of other’s mental
states but evaluate other general cognitive functions.
1Ekman faces: emotion labelling and emotion discrimination and Facial Expressions of emotions (FEES)
2Task and normative data collection in French.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t001
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(i.e. when considered as representative test of all ToM abilities; [40]), its contribution alongside
other tests for ToM assessment has stood the test of time as it is particularly sensitive to iden-
tify ToM deficits. Indeed, the ability to infer false beliefs is one of the later abilities to develop
in children [41] and reasoning about such mental states recruits particularly effortful reasoning
processes [42] at least when explicit false belief reasoning is probed (for cases of false belief
tasks that appear less effortful, see for example [43–44]). This explains the sensitivity of the
classic false belief paradigm even though impaired false belief reasoning does not necessarily
mean that all ToM abilities are impaired.
Previous neuropsychological studies reporting dissociations in brain-damaged patients’
performance highlighted the separability of different types of inferential processes which are
involved in belief reasoning (and also in reasoning about other mental states). The first type of
process is the ability to resist interference from one’s own perspective. In daily life, we often
hold a different view to other people (we have different desires, emotions etc.). Thus, correctly
reasoning about other people’s mental states requires to putting aside our own point of view.
More particularly when we reason about someone else’s belief about the state of affairs, we
usually know the real state of affairs. In those circumstances, resisting interference from the
knowledge of reality can be challenging, even for healthy adults [45]. Since the first cognitive
models of ToM, authors have incorporated an inhibitory processing component that handles
the conflict that arises in those circumstances (see for example, the Theory of Mind Mecha-
nism Selection Processor proposed by Leslie and his colleagues [46–47] which is described as
an executive control process that inhibits the content of the belief selected by default and
changes the focus of attention to the most appropriate belief content). Evidence from neuro-
psychology has shown that there are particular neural and functional mechanisms that deal
with the inhibition of one’s own perspective. This process of inhibition has been illustrated by
the case of patient WBA who suffered a brain damage to the right lateral prefrontal cortex fol-
lowing a stroke and who was unable to infer someone else’s mental state (including beliefs and
desires) as long as he himself held a strong view (i.e., as long as he knew the real state of affairs
or held a conflicting desire; for more details, see [17–19]). By contrast, the patient was able to
infer correctly the mental states of others when the demands in self-perspective inhibition
were reduced, showing that the deficit was very selective. Interestingly, it has recently been
shown that self-perspective inhibition does not only involve domain-general executive pro-
cesses but may instead recruit, at least in part, executive processes more specific to perspective
taking [18] (for a review see [48]). Furthermore, the role of the right lateral prefrontal cortex in
self-perspective inhibition has been corroborated with evidence from neuroimaging studies in
healthy adults [49–53].
A deficit in self-perspective inhibition is, however, not the sole origin of belief reasoning
difficulties in patients. Several patients with lesions to the left temporo-parietal junction were
shown to be insensitive to manipulations of self-perspective inhibition demands indicating
that the origin of their deficits was unrelated to self-perspective inhibition [19–20; 54–55]. A
recent study identified the origin of the deficit in some of these patients as resulting from an
inability to spontaneously infer or take into account other people’s beliefs [20]. More specifi-
cally, patients KV and IM were unable to take into account in their reasoning that another per-
son has a false belief when the question did not directly ask them to pay attention to the other
person’s mental state. In contrast, when the patients were explicitly asked what the other per-
son would do or what the other person thought, the patients were perfectly able to infer the
other person’s false belief. Again such dissociation highlights the selectivity of the deficit.
The distinction between self-perspective inhibition and spontaneous other-perspective tak-
ing is not only relevant for cases of patients with focal acquired brain-damaged. For example,
in the case of patients diagnosed with dementia, it has been shown that patients with the
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behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have a selective impairment in self-per-
spective inhibition, while this was not the case for patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease
[56]. Selective difficulties in self-perspective inhibition have also been highlighted in older
adults [57]. In contrast, deficits in spontaneous other-perspective taking have been docu-
mented in autism [58] and in individuals with alcohol dependence [59].
Deficits in self-perspective inhibition will manifest themselves differently in everyday life
than deficits in the spontaneous inference of the other perspective. In the former case, we can
expect the patients to be extremely egocentric and self-centered which will most likely generate
inter-personal conflicts. In the case of a deficit in spontaneous other-perspective inference, we
can expect the patients to often miss out on subtle hints about other people’s mental states
which may increase the likelihood of misunderstandings during social interactions. Given the
different nature underlying each of these types of deficits, we can also expect different inter-
ventions to be needed to best fit with the patients’ difficulties.
The diversity of clinical populations for whom the distinction between self-perspective inhi-
bition and spontaneous other-perspective taking is relevant, the important negative effects of
deficits to one or the other type of process for successful social interactions, the specific and
differential interventions that such deficits may require highlight how essential it becomes to
have good clinical tools to assess the integrity of these processes.
The aim of the current study was to optimize two existing belief reasoning tasks in order to
make them suitable for clinical assessment. Those two tasks have been previously used for fun-
damental research purposes in order to distinguish self-perspective inhibition deficits from
deficits in spontaneous other-perspective inference. The clinical adaptations consisted in
reducing the length of administration, collecting normative data and standardizing the inter-
pretation of the performance. We first describe the sample of participants (healthy participants
and brain-damaged patients) and the shortened version of the tasks. We then present and
explain the three-step procedure to classify the performance of patients. Finally, we report the
results of the normative data collection and the results of the classification on a sample of
patients with brain damage. The research protocol was approved by the biomedical ethics




Healthy participants. One hundred twenty-five healthy participants have been tested for
the normative data collection phase of the two belief reasoning tasks. The inclusion criteria
were: being aged between 18 and 74 years, to speak French, and not to suffer from a known
neurological condition. The participants were recruited by diverse advertisements distributed
to the pool of volunteers at the Universite´ catholique de Louvain and via social media. All the
participants gave their written consent and received a small financial compensation for their
participation. A short neuropsychological examination was performed for participants above
the age of 49 in order to exclude potential participants who have impaired cognitive abilities.
This neuropsychological examination included the Mini Mental State Evaluation (MMSE)
[60], the Ten Word-List Recall from the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s
Disease (CERAD) [61], the Trail Making Test [62], the Category Fluency Test and the Letter
Fluency Test [63] and the LEXIS Naming Test [64]. Participants above 49 years of age who
obtained a score that was 2 standard deviation below the norms on at least two of the neuro-
psychological tests were excluded from the sample (n = 1). The final sample thus included 124
participants (see Table 2 for the participants’ characteristics). Based on a previous study [28],
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the participants were spread across four age groups (18–34 years, 35–49 years, 50–64 years and
65–74 years). The participants were also divided into two groups according to their socio-edu-
cational level: participants who have accomplished 12 years of education or below (level 1) and
participants who have accomplished more than 12 years of education (level 2). Moreover, the
participants were split according to gender.
Brain-damaged patients. Twenty-one brain damaged patients (13 women and 7 with a
socio-educational level 1, mean age = 57.66 (SD = 11.80), age range (min-max) = 38–74 years)
participated in this second phase of our study. The brain lesions of the patients were of various
etiologies: stroke (n = 11), brain tumor (n = 2), cerebral anoxia (n = 1), encephalitis meningitis
(n = 1), degenerative dementia of Alzheimer’s type (n = 6). This group of patients was hetero-
geneous but it is representative of the population of brain damaged patients who consult in
clinical neuropsychology. The exclusion criteria were the presence of a hemianopia or neglect,
as well as major language comprehension deficits. These cognitive deficits were detected by
means of standardized tests conventionally used in the neuropsychological diagnostic protocol
by the clinicians from the Cliniques universitaires Saint-Luc. The patients were recruited from
the Cliniques universitaires Saint-Luc, Brussels. All the patients gave their written consent and
received financial compensation for their participation.
Description of the tasks
Two belief reasoning tasks were used. These non-verbal tasks were created by Apperly and
Samson [17, 54–55]. The original tasks included a total of 120 trials which made it unfeasible
to use these tasks as clinical tools for time constraint reasons. The number of trials was thus
reduced to achieve a total of 48 trials. A subset of selected patients performed the long and
original version of the tasks and the interpretation of their profile was compared with the
interpretation derived when we only took into account the reduced number of trials. The
interpretation was very similar and we thus decided to proceed with the shortened version.
For each task, the instructions were explained to the participants before starting the tasks.
Practice trials, which did not include false beliefs, preceded the test trials to ensure that partici-
pants understood the instructions. During the test trials, feedback consisting of a photograph
depicting the correct answer was presented after each trial to ensure that participants were
aware of their incorrect reasoning and were given the opportunity to rectify their reasoning on
the next trials. The trials were presented in pseudo-random order (ensuring that there were
never more than three trials of the same type one after the other).
Reality-unknown belief reasoning task. The first task, labelled as « reality-unknown » or
« low inhibition » task in previous studies [54–55], was an adaptation of the non-verbal false
belief task designed by Call and Tomasello [65]. It consisted of non-verbal short videos
inserted within a PowerPoint presentation (Table 3, see also [20]). For each video, the partici-
pant’s task was to find the location of a green object. It was explained that the woman in the
Table 2. Characteristics of the healthy participants (n = 124) for the normative data collection phase of the two
belief reasoning tasks.
Socio-educational level 1 Socio-educational level 2
Women Men Women Men
18–34 years (n = 34) 8 8 10 8
35–49 years (n = 30) 8 7 8 7
50–64 years (n = 33) 9 8 8 8
65–74 years (n = 27) 8 3 8 8
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t002
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video is there to help participants find the location of the green object by using a pink marker
that she will put on top of one of two opaque boxe.
At the beginning of each video, participants can see a man hiding a green object in one of
the two opaque boxes. The man shows to the woman, sitting next to him, where the green
object is located. While the woman can see the location of the green object; the angle of the
camera is such that participants cannot see in which box the green object is located. In the
false belief trials, the woman then leaves the room. During her absence, the man swaps the
boxes. The woman comes back in the room, sits down and puts the pink marker on top of one
of the boxes. At that point the video is stopped and participants have to point to the box which
contains the green object. To answer correctly, participants have to understand that the
woman has a false belief about the location of the green object (because the boxes were
swapped during her absence), that she therefore put the marker on top of the incorrect
box and that therefore the green object is in the other location. Importantly, because partici-
pants do not directly witness where the object is placed originally, when they infer that the
woman has a false belief, they have no competing knowledge of the real location of the object.
It is only after they have inferred the false belief that they can know where the object is. The
demands in terms of self-perspective inhibition are therefore reduced during the belief reason-
ing operations.
The aim of this task is to assess the ability of the participants to infer spontaneously the
belief of others, i.e. without explicit instructions to do so. Indeed, the question asked at the end
of each video (« show me where the green object is ») directs participants’ attention to the loca-
tion of the object and not to the mental states of the woman. To check that a deficit in this task
is specifically caused by belief reasoning difficulties, different categories of trials other than
Table 3. Description of the sequences of events of the different trial categories in the « reality-unknown » belief reasoning task.
Categories
of trials
Description of the sequences of events of the reality-unknown videos
FB S1: The man
hides the green
object in one of
two boxes.
S2: The man shows
to the woman where
the green object is
located.
S3: The woman leaves
the room.
S4: During the absence of
the woman, the man swaps
the boxes.
S5: The woman returns in
the room.
S6: The woman
indicates one of two
boxes with the pink
object.
TB S1: The man
hides the green
object in one of
two boxes.
S2: The man shows
to the woman where
the green object is
located.
S3: The woman leaves
the room.
S4: During the absence of
the woman, the man lifts
the boxes without
swapping them.
S5: The woman returns in
the room.
S6: The woman
indicates one of two
boxes with the pink
object.
MC S1: The man
hides the green
object in one of
two boxes.
S2: The man shows
to the woman where
the green object is
located.
S3: The woman
indicates one of the
two boxes with the
pink object.
S4: The woman leaves the
room.
S5: During the absence of
the woman, the man swaps
the boxes.
S6: The woman
returns in the room.
Fillers S1: The man
hides the green
object in one of
two boxes.
S2: The man shows
to the woman where
the green object is
located.
S3: The woman
indicates one of the
two boxes with the
pink object.
S4: The woman leaves the
room.
S5: During the absence of
the woman,
the man moves the object
from one of the boxes to
the other box (visible
transfer)
S6: The woman
returns in the room.
Note that in all the first sequences (S1), the location of the object is not visible to the participants because of the camera’s angle of view. FB = false belief trials, TB = true
belief trials, MC = memory control trials, S = Sequence. The changes made in the different categories of trials compared to the false belief category are in bold.
Compared to FB trials, in the TB trials, the location of the green object is not changed. In the MC trials, the participant knows the object’s location at the beginning of
the trial but needs to keep this information in working memory and update it when the man swaps the boxes. In the filler trials, the man makes a visible transfer of the
green object which can therefore be seen by participants. This allows participants to realize that the woman genuinely tries to help since participants can directly see that
the box the woman pointed at is the true location of the green object. For more details about these trials, see [55].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t003
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false belief trials were integrated within the task (see Table 3). The task consists of a total of 24
trials, with 8 false belief trials, 4 true belief trials, 9 memory control trials and 3 filler trials.
Memory control and filler trials allow identifying belief reasoning difficulties which would be
linked to difficulties with processing the input information (due for example attentional, mem-
ory or comprehension problems). True belief trials allow checking that a good performance on
the false beliefs trials was not caused by the application of superficial strategies based on the
feedback received (such as for example systematically choosing the box opposite to the box the
woman pointed at). While such strategies could lead to a correct response on false belief trials,
they would however lead to an incorrect response on the true belief trials.
Reality-known belief reasoning task. The second task, labelled as « reality-known » or «
high inhibition » in previous studies [17], was adapted from classic false belief scenarios such
as those originally designed by Wimmer and Perner [39]. This task is relatively similar to the «
reality-unknown » belief reasoning task, except that this time, participants have knowledge of
the object location throughout the video. The videos also include a male and a female actor
(with a different identity to the actors involved in the previous task). At the beginning of each
video, the man places the green object in one of the two opaque boxes in full view of both the
woman and participants. In the false belief trials, the woman then leaves the room and during
her absence, the man opens the boxes to make a visible transfer of the green object from one
box to the other. The woman then returns, sits down and looks at a neutral location in the
middle of the two boxes. The video then stops and participants are asked to point to the
box that the woman will open first to find the green object. To answer correctly, participants
have to put aside their own knowledge about the true location of the green object and consider
that the woman has not seen the transfer of location and therefore wrongly thinks that the
green object is still in the old location. Thus, in contrast to the previous task, the demands
in self-perspective inhibition are high. The task consists of a total of 24 trials (see Table 4)
amongst which 8 false belief trials, 9 true belief/memory control trials (these trials are qualified
as both true belief and memory control because they play both roles) and 7 filler trials (see
Table 4). The true belief/memory control trials and filler trials aim to assess the participants’
abilities to deal with the input information (these abilities can be impaired by general cognitive
problems such as attentional, memory or comprehension difficulties). The true belief/memory
control trials allow checking that correct responses on false belief trials really reflect genuine
belief reasoning rather than the use of a superficial strategy.
Table 4. Description of the sequences of the different trial categories at the « reality-known » belief reasoning task.
Categories of
trials
Description of the sequences of events of the reality-known videos
FB S1: The man puts the green object in




S3: During the absence of the woman, the man moves the object
from one of the boxes to the other box.
S4: The woman
returns in the room.
TB/MC S1: The man puts the green object in




S3: During the absence of the woman, the man takes out the
green object from the box and puts it back in the same box.
S4: The woman
returns in the room.
Fillers S1: The man hides the green object in
one of two boxes, in sight of the
woman.
S2: The woman
stays in the room.
S3: In presence of the woman, the man takes out the green
object from the box and puts it back in the same box or puts it
in the other box.
S4: The woman stays
always in the room.
Note that in all the first sequences (S1), the participants know the location of the object (the placement of the object in one of the two boxes is visible). FB = false belief
trials, TB/MC = true belief/memory control trials, S = Sequence. The changes made in the different categories of trials compared to the false belief category are in bold.
In the TB/MC trials, the man’s manipulation of the object during the absence of the woman does not result in a change of location. In the Filler trials, the woman stays
in the room and witnesses all the object manipulations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t004
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The two belief reasoning tasks were administrated to all participants (healthy participants
and brain-damaged participants) always in the following order: the reality-unknown task
before the reality-known task. It is important to keep that particular order to keep the demands
in spontaneous other-perspective inference high (the reverse order would mean that partici-
pants would be primed by the reality-known task instruction to pay attention to the woman’s
mental states). The two tasks were administrated in one session for healthy participants (with a
short break between the two tasks) and in two separate sessions in brain-damaged participants
(to avoid excessive tiredness). The videos were displayed via a Power-Point presentation on a
computer. The answers were manually recorded by the examiner. Both tasks and the instruc-
tions are made freely available on Figshare: [https://figshare.com/s/753c27e53a1267bc8042]
Classification procedure
A three-step classification method was designed to classify the patients according to their per-
formance in the two false belief reasoning tasks and in relation to self-perspective inhibition,
spontaneous other-perspective inference and the ability to process input information for belief
reasoning. It is important to note that what we propose here is a generic rationale. Clinicians
are invited to use in addition their clinical observations to refine their interpretation of the
patients’ performance, to measure for example the impact of attentional deficits on the task
performance.
Step 1: Analysis of the performance in the reality-unknown belief reasoning task.
Three scores were calculated based on the performance on the reality-unknown belief reason-
ing task: the total number of correct responses on the false belief trials (FB, score out of 8), the
total number of correct responses on the true belief trials (TB, score out of 4) and the total
number of correct responses on the control trials. This latter score takes into account both the
memory control trials (MC) and the filler trials (MC + Fillers, score out of 12). The decision
tree schematized in Fig 1 was then used to compare the participant’s scores with the cut-off
scores derived from the matched healthy controls’ performance collected in the current study
and classify the global profile of the participant in the task.
It is first determined whether the participant has a score for the FB trials that is at or below
the cut-off score (mean score of control participants minus 2 standard deviations, cf. Table 5).
If the score is below cut-off then the difference between their performance on the FB trials and
relevant control trials (i.e., memory control and filler trials) is to be examined to determine
whether there is a dissociation between the two scores. The rationale behind this is that if a
patient has equivalent difficulty with FB trials and control trials, it means that he has a probable
impairment processing the input information, which will naturally lead to errors on FB trials.
On the other hand, if a patient makes significantly more errors on the FB trials than on the
control trials, this means that he or she probably has difficulties with belief processing per se
above any deficit in processing the input information. To establish the possible presence of a
dissociation, and because the maximum score was different for FB compared to control trials,
the percentage of correct responses (rather than the absolute number of correct responses) for
the FB trials has to be subtracted from the percentage of correct responses for the control trials.
If this difference equals or exceeds the cut-off value (mean difference in control participants
+ 2 standard deviations, cf. Table 6), this indicates the presence of a dissociation, indicating
likely impairment in belief processing per se. Note however that even if the difference indicates
a dissociation, a probable impairment in belief processing could also be combined with diffi-
culties in processing the input information in some cases. For example, for a patient (35 years)
who has a performance of 50% for the control trials and 12,5% for false belief trials, we will
conclude that the difference between his performance on false belief trials and on control trials
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is below the cut-off suggesting a difficulties in reasoning about false belief per se. However, his
performance on the control trials suggest that he has, in addition, general cognitive difficulties
which probably also interfere in belief reasoning. Whether the performance on control trials is
below the cut-off score can be checked in Table 5. The absence of dissociation (difference
below the cut-off value) demonstrates that the performance on FB trials is probably contami-
nated with difficulties in processing the input information to belief reasoning (possibly due to
other cognitive difficulties such as attentional, memory or comprehension difficulties).
If the participant has a score for the FB trials that is above the cut-off score (cf. Table 5),
than the difference between the performance on the TB trials and the FB trials is to be exam-
ined to see whether there is a dissociation between the two scores. The rationale behind this is
that if a patient makes significantly more errors on the TB trials than on the FB trials this
means that he or she probably uses a superficial strategy to succeed on the FB trials based on
the feedback received (such as for example systematically choosing the other box to the
box that the woman pointed at). On the other hand, if the patient’s performance is as good on
the TB as on the FB trials this means that he or she does not use a compensatory strategy and
thus has no difficulties with belief processing. Here again, to establish the possible presence of
Fig 1. Decision tree to analyze the patient’s profile in the reality-unknown belief reasoning task. FB = false belief, TB = true belief, Control trials include
MC (memory control) + Filler trials, Such deficit could be combined with difficulties in processing the input information if the performance on the control
trials is below the cut-off albeit better than the performance on the FB trials.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.g001
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a dissociation, and because the maximum score was different for FB compared to TB trials, the
percentage of correct responses (rather than the absolute number of correct responses) for the
FB trials has to be subtracted from the percentage of correct responses for the TB trials. If this
difference is equal or below to the cut-off value (mean difference in control participants—2
standard deviations, cf. Table 6), this indicates the presence of a dissociation which is in favor
of a profile qualified as possible « false negative » i.e. the subject may have used a superficial
strategy to compensate probable difficulties with belief processing.
Table 5. Cut-off scores (threshold values derived from the healthy controls’ performance collected in the current
study; if the participant’s performance is at or below this cut-off score, her/his performance is pathological) for
the false belief, true belief and control trials in the reality-unknown task and the reality-known task.
Mean Standard deviation (SD) Mean minus 2 SD Cut-off
FB « Reality-unknown» (score out of 8)
18–34 years 7.32 1.12 5.08 5
35–49 years 7.50 0.90 5.25 5
50–64 years 6.85 1.46 3.93 4
65–74 years 6.48 1.50 3.48 3
Control trials « Reality-unknown» (score out of 12)
18–34 years 12 0.00 12.00 10
35–49 years 11.9 0.30 11.30 10
50–64 years 11.79 0.48 10.83 10
65–74 years 11.88 0.32 11.24 10
TB « Reality-unknown» (score out of 4)
18–34 years 3.94 0.24 3.46 2
35–49 years 3.90 0.40 3.10 2
50–64 years 3.79 0.54 2.71 2
65–74 years 3.63 0.63 2.37 2
FB « Reality-known » (score out of 8)
18–34 years 7.94 0.24 7.46 6
35–49 years 7.87 0.43 7.01 6
50–64 years 7.88 0.55 6.78 6
65–74 years 7.85 0.36 7.13 6
Control trials « Reality-known » (score out of 16)
18–34 years 15.94 0.24 15.46 14
35–49 years 15.96 0.18 15.60 14
50–64 years 15.93 0.35 15.23 14
65–74 years 15.77 0.51 14.75 14
TB/MC « Reality-known » (score out of 9)
18–34 years 8.97 0.17 8.63 7
35–49 years 9 0 9.00 7
50–64 years 8.94 0.35 8.24 7
65–74 years 8.93 0.27 8.39 7
TB = True belief trials. FB = False belief trials. TB/MC = True belief/memory control trials.
 = acceptance of one distraction error. The control trials include memory control and fillers for reality-unknown
task. Control trials include true belief/memory control and filler trials for reality-known task. For the false belief and
control trials of each task (each expressed on a score out of 8, 12 or 16), the cut-off scores were calculated according
to a sequence of criteria: 1) the mean minus 2 standard deviation obtained was rounded mathematically without
decimals (e.g., 3,93/8 became 4/8); 2) if this cut-off value does not allow for one distraction error, the value was
lowered by one unit to allow for a distraction error (e.g., for a z-score of 7,46/8, the cut-off became 6/8).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t005
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Step 2: Analysis of the performance in the reality-known belief reasoning task. Three
scores were calculated based on the performance on the reality-known belief reasoning task:
the total number of correct responses on the false belief trials (FB, score out of 8), the total
number of correct responses on the true belief/memory control trials (TB/MC, score out of 9;
as a reminder, these trials act as both true belief and memory control trials) and the total num-
ber of correct responses on the control trials (TB/MC + Fillers, score out of 16). This latter
score takes into account both the true belief/memory control trials (TB/MC) and the filler tri-
als. The decision tree schematized in Fig 2 was then used to compare the participant’s scores
with the cut-off scores derived from the matched healthy controls’ performance collected in
the current study. This allowed to classify the global profile of the participant in the task.
If the participant has a score for the FB trials that is at or below the cut-off score (cf.
Table 5), than the difference between the performance on the control trials (TB/MC + Fillers)
and the FB trials is to be examined to determine whether there is a dissociation between the
two scores. The rationale behind this is the same as the one described for the reality-unknown
version of the task. To establish the possible presence of a dissociation, the percentage of cor-
rect responses (rather than the absolute number of correct responses) for the FB trials has to
be subtracted from the percentage of correct responses for the control trials. If this difference
is equal or above the cut-off value (mean difference in control participants + 2 standard devia-
tions, cf. Table 6), this indicates the presence of a dissociation which is in favor of a probable
impairment in belief processing per se. Note also that as for the reality-unknown version of the
task, even if the difference indicates a dissociation, a probable impairment in belief processing
could be also combined with difficulties in processing the input information in some cases (see
Table 5 for the cut-off scores for the control trials). Conversely, the absence of dissociation
(difference below the cut-off value) indicates that the performance on FB trials is probably
contaminated by difficulties in processing the input information to belief reasoning.
If the participant has a score for the FB trials that is above to the cut-off score (cf. Table 5),
than the difference between the performance on the TB/MC trials and the FB trials is to be
examined to determine whether there is a dissociation between the two scores. The rationale is
again the same as the one described for the reality-unknown version of the task. To establish
Table 6. The cut-off scores (derived from the healthy controls’ performance collected in the current study) to determine the presence or absence of a dissociation
between two categories of trials.
Cut-offs
For the reality-unknown task For the reality-known task
Control trials minus FB trials TB trials minus
FB trials
Control trials minus FB trials TB and MC trials minus
FB trials
18–34 years 36.5% -25.1% 7.2% -11.1%
35–49 years 27.5% -19.1% 11.7% -11.1%
50–64 years 50.4% -26.9% 10.7% -11.1%
65–74 years 56.2% -33.2% 11.4% -11.1%
Deficit if value is = or > than cut-off = or < than cut-off = or > than cut-off < than cut-off
FB = false beliefs, MC = memory control, TB = true beliefs, control trials include memory control and fillers for reality-unknown task. Control trials include true belief/
memory control and filler trials for reality-known task.
 = acceptance of one distraction error on true belief/memory control trials.
The raw scores for each type of trial were transformed in percentages to be on the same scale. To identify potential dissociations between the FB trials and the TB or
control trials, the differences between these categories of trials (expressed in terms of percentage of correct responses) were calculated for each control participant. The
cut-off score is equivalent to 2 standard deviations away from the mean performance of the control participants by age group. However, if the cut-off value did not allow
for a distraction error, the value was lowered to allow for a distraction error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t006
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the possible presence of a dissociation, the percentage of correct responses for the FB trials has
to be subtracted from the percentage of correct responses for the TB/MC trials. If this differ-
ence is equal to or below the cut-off value (mean difference in control participants—2 standard
deviations, cf. Table 6), this indicates the presence of a dissociation which is in favor of a pro-
file qualified as « false negative » i.e. the subject uses alternative strategy to compensate proba-
ble difficulties with belief processing. The absence of dissociation (difference above to the cut-
off value) demonstrates that the subject has no deficit in belief processing.
Step 3: Analysis of the integrity of the ToM processes. Finally, the relative integrity of
the participants’ ability to spontaneously infer someone else’s belief and to inhibit their own
perspective was examined by comparing the profile obtained for each belief reasoning task
(cf. Table 7). The general rationale is the following. Given that each task loads differentially
on the spontaneous other-belief tracking and self-perspective inhibition demands, the stron-
gest conclusion of a deficit in spontaneous other-belief tracking can be drawn when the partic-
ipant exhibits a probable impairment in belief reasoning in the reality-unknown task and
shows a classical or strong dissociation between his/her belief reasoning abilities in the reality-
unknown versus the reality-known tasks, with more difficulties in the reality-unknown task
Fig 2. Decision tree to analyze the patient’s profile in the reality-known belief reasoning task. FB = false belief, TB/MC = true belief/memory control,
Control trials include TB/MC + filler trials,  Such deficit could be combined with difficulties in processing the input information if the performance on
the control trials is below the cut-off albeit better than the performance on the FB trials.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.g002
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Table 7. Decision table to analyze the integrity of the targeted ToM processes. The interpretations are based on the various possible profiles of performance across the
two belief reasoning tasks. According to the patient’s performance profile in the reality-unknown belief reasoning task, the clinician is invited to select the profile of perfor-
mance in the reality-known task, followed by the type of dissociation across the false belief trials of the two tasks.
Spared belief reasoning in the RUK task
Interpretation in RK task Dissociation across FB in RUK
vs. RK
(See cut-offs for differential
scores in Table 8)
Interpretation of integrity of the two target ToM processes
Spared belief reasoning n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: spared
• Self-perspective inhibition: spared
Impairment of belief reasoning Yes (= classical dissociation) • Spontaneous other-belief processing: spared
• Self-perspective inhibition: impaired
No (= no reliable dissociation) • Spontaneous other-belief processing: spared
• Self-perspective inhibition: mildly impaired
Difficulties in processing the
input information
n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: spared
• Self-perspective inhibition: Needs re-testing in the RK task when the ability to process the input
information has been improved
False negative n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: spared
• Self-perspective inhibition: Needs re-testing in the RK task with strategies being explicitly
discouraged
Impairment of belief reasoning in the RUK task
Interpretation in RK task Dissociation across FB in RUK
vs. RK
(See cut-offs for differential
scores in Table 8)
Interpretation of integrity of the two target ToM processes
Spared belief reasoning Yes (= classical dissociation) • Spontaneous other-belief processing: impaired
• Self-perspective inhibition: spared
No (= no reliable dissociation) • Spontaneous other-belief processing: mildly impaired
• Self-perspective inhibition: spared
Impairment of belief reasoning Yes (= strong dissociation) • Spontaneous other-belief processing: impaired
• Self-perspective inhibition: impaired
• One process is more impaired than the other (depending on the direction of the dissociation)
No (= no reliable dissociation) • Needs further investigation to see whether both processes are impaired or another ToM process
common to both tasks is impaired (such as a loss of knowledge about beliefs)
Difficulties in processing the
input information
n/a • Needs re-testing in the RK task when the ability to process the input information has been improved
to see whether both ToM processes are impaired or another ToM process common to both tasks is
impaired (such as a loss of knowledge about beliefs) or solely the spontaneous other-belief processing
is impaired
False negative n/a • Needs re-testing in the RK task with strategies being explicitly discouraged to see whether both ToM
processes are impaired or another ToM process common to both tasks is impaired (such as a loss of
knowledge about beliefs) or solely the spontaneous other-belief processing is impaired
Difficulties in processing the input in the RUK task
Interpretation in RK task Dissociation across FB in RUK
vs. RK
(See cut-offs for differential
scores in Table 8)
Interpretation of integrity of the two target ToM processes
Spared belief reasoning n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: Needs re-testing in the RUK task when the ability to process
the input information has been improved
• Self-perspective inhibition: spared
Impairment of belief reasoning n/a • Needs re-testing in the RUK task when the ability to process the input information has been
improved to see whether both ToM processes are impaired or another ToM process common to both
tasks is impaired (such as a loss of knowledge about beliefs) or solely the spontaneous self-perspective
inhibition processing is impaired
Difficulties in processing the
input information
n/a • Needs re-testing in the RK and RUK task when the ability to process the input information has been
improved
False negative n/a • Needs re-testing in the RUK task when the ability to process the input information has been
improved
• Needs re-testing in the RK task with strategies being explicitly discouraged
(Continued)
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(cf. Table 8 for the cut-offs for differential scores between the false belief trials in the two
tasks). Indeed, in a single-case studies, a classical dissociation is established when the following
three criteria are met: 1) the patient has a deficit on Task X, 2) the patient is within normal lim-
its on Task Y and 3) there is a significant difference between performances on Task X and Y. A
strong dissociation (or differential deficit) is a weaker version of dissociation and is established
when 1) the patient has a deficit on Task X, 2) the patient has also a deficit on Task Y, and 3)
there is a significant difference between performances on Task X and Y [66]. Likewise, the
strongest conclusion of a deficit in self-perspective inhibition can be drawn when the partici-
pant shows a probable impairment in belief reasoning abilities in the reality-known task and
the reverse classical or strong dissociation between his belief reasoning abilities across the two
tasks.
Table 7. (Continued)
False negative in the RUK task
Interpretation in RK task Dissociation across FB in RUK
vs. RK
(See cut-offs for differential
scores in Table 8)
Interpretation of integrity of the two target ToM processes
Spared belief reasoning n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: Needs re-testing in the RUK task with strategies being
explicitly discouraged
• Self-perspective inhibition: spared
Impairment of belief reasoning n/a • Needs re-testing in the RK task with strategies being explicitly discouraged to see whether both ToM
processes are impaired or another ToM process common to both tasks is impaired (such as a loss of
knowledge about beliefs) or solely the slef-perspective inhibition processing is impaired
Difficulties in processing the
input information
n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: Needs re-testing in the RUK task with strategies being
explicitly discouraged
• Self-perspective inhibition: Needs re-testing in the RK task when the ability to process the input
information has been improved
False negative n/a • Spontaneous other-belief processing: Needs re-testing in the RUK task with strategies being
explicitly discouraged
• Self-perspective inhibition: Needs re-testing in the RK task with strategies being explicitly
discouraged
RK = reality-known belief reasoning task, RUK = the reality-unknown belief reasoning task, FB = false belief items, n/a = not-applicable.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t007
Table 8. The cut-off scores (threshold values derived from the healthy controls’ performance collected in the cur-
rent study; if the difference of participant’s scores is at or above this cut-off score, the difference is pathological),
for the difference between the false belief trials of the reality-known task and the false belief trials of the reality-
unknown task.
Cut-off





FB = false belief trials. To determine the presence or the absence of a dissociation between false belief trials of each
task, the differences between the FB trials of each task were calculated for each control participant. The cut-off scores
were then calculated for each age group following these criteria: the value obtained was rounded at the higher unit
(e.g., 4,36/8 became 5/8) to minimise the potential presence of false positives. Because the number of trials was
identical across the two tasks, we used here the raw value rather than percentages
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t008
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When a participant shows a profile conforming to a probable belief reasoning impairment
in both tasks and there is no dissociation, then one can only conclude that either both the
spontaneous other-belief tracking and the self-perspective inhibition processes are impaired or
that the impairment affects a ToM process common to both tasks. For example, one may make
the hypothesis that the participant has lost knowledge about the nature of beliefs or about how
they are formed. Additional investigation could probe the participant’s ToM knowledge to dis-
entangle these possible interpretations (for example, the clinician may ask questions probing
the patient’s knowledge about the nature of beliefs).
When there is a probable belief reasoning impairment in one task but there is either no dis-
sociation with the belief reasoning performance in the other task or the performance in the
other task conforms to an input processing impairment or a false negative, then it can only be
concluded that the ToM processes assessed in the task in which the patient shows a belief rea-
soning impairment is “possibly” impaired. Here also additional investigation would be needed
to disentangle the possible interpretations.
Finally, whenever belief reasoning is spared in a task, the processes assessed in the task can
be interpreted as spared. Table 7 details the interpretations based on the various possible pro-
files of performance across the two belief reasoning tasks.
Results
Healthy participants
We first tested whether performance varied significantly according to the age, the gender and
the socio-educational level of the healthy participants in order to specify according to which
variable the norms should be computed. For each task, an ANOVA was run on the percentage
of correct responses with the type of trials (3 levels for the reality-unknown belief reasoning
task: FB trials, TB trials and control trials which include MC and filler trials; 3 levels for the
reality-known belief reasoning task: FB trials, TB/MC trials and Filler trials) as a repeated fac-
tor, and the age group (4 levels: 18–34, 35–49, 50–64, 65–74), the gender and the socio-educa-
tional level (2 levels: below or above 12 years) as between-participant factors. When the
sphericity assumption was violated, degrees of freedom were corrected by using the Green-
house-Geisser correction when the sphericity estimate was lower than .75 and the Huynh-
Feldt correction when this estimate was greater than .75 (Girden, 1992, cited by Field, 2005,
p. 431 [67]). In order to explain any significant interaction, we ran post-hoc analyses. Finally,
in order to test whether the tasks differed in terms of complexity, we ran an ANOVA on the
percentage of correct responses on the false belief trials with the task (reality-unknown vs.
known) as a repeated factor and the age, the socio-educational level and the gender as
between-participant factors.
For the reality-unknown belief reasoning task, the main effect of age was significant, F(3,
108) = 5.91, p< .01, ηp2 = .14. In contrast, neither the main effect of gender nor the main effect
of socio-educational level were significant, both Fs(1, 108)< 1, ps> .10. All the double interac-
tions involving these variables were not significant either (all ps>. 10), except the Age by Gen-
der interaction that was marginally significant, F(3, 108) = 2.62, p = .06. This interaction can
be first explained by the fact that performance did not differ between women and men (18–34
y.o.: t(32) = —.50, p> .10; 50–64 y.o.: t(31) = -1.07, p> .10; 65–74 y.o.: t(25) = 1.59, p> .10),
except in the 35–49 year olds, t(15.75) = -2.85, p = .01 (see Fig 3). In this age group, women
(M = 94.3%, SD = 7.5%) performed less accurately than men (M = 99.7%, SD = 1.1%). The
interaction can also be explained by the fact that the effect of Age was not significant in
women, F(3, 63) = 1.32, p> .10, while it was significant in men, F(3, 53) = 9.42, p< .01, ηp2 =
.35. Among men, the 65–74 year-olds (M = 87.0%, SD = 9.5%) performed significantly less
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accurately compared to the 18–34 year-olds (M = 97.1%, SD = 4.7%), p< .01, to the 35–49
year-olds (M = 99.7%, SD = 1.1%), p< .01, and to the 50–64 year-olds, (M = 94.5%, SD =
7.3%), p< .01. The 50–64 year-olds also performed significantly less accurately than the 35–49
year-olds, p< .05.
Furthermore, the main effect of the type of trials was significant, F(2, 216) = 32.87, p< .01,
ηp
2 = .23. This effect did not interact with gender, socio-educational level or any combination
of these variables (all Fs < 1, ps > .10). In contrast, the main effect of the type of trials signifi-
cantly interacted with the age group, F(6, 216) = 2.23, p = .04, ηp2 = .06. In order to explain this
interaction, we first tested the effect of the type of trials for each age group separately. This effect
was significant for all age groups (all ps< .05): accuracy was significantly lower for the FB trials
than for the TB trials and the control trials (which included MC and filler trials) in all age
groups (all ps< .05), except in the 35–49 group for which the difference between the FB trials
and the TB trials was only marginally significant (p = .08). In addition, accuracy was lower for
the TB trials than for the control trials (i.e., MC and filler trials) in the 65–74 year-olds, p = .01.
Second, we tested the effect of the age group for each type of trials separately (see Fig 4). The
effect of the age group was significant for the FB trials, F(3, 120) = 3.89, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. Accu-
racy was lower for the 65–74 year-olds compared to the 35–49 year-olds, p< .01, and to the 18–
34 year-olds, p = .01, and lower for the 50–64 year-olds than for the 35–49 year-olds, p = .04.
For the TB trials, the effect of the age group tended to be significant, F(3, 120) = 2.58, p = .06,
ηp
2 = .06, with the accuracy being lower in the 65–74 year-olds compared to the 35–49 year-
olds, p = .03, and to the 18–34 year-olds, p = .01. For the control trials (i.e., MC and filler trials),
Fig 3. Percentage of correct responses according to age group and gender for the reality-unknown belief reasoning task. Accuracy did not differ significantly
between women and men, except in the 35–49 year-olds. The error bars represent the confidence intervals 95% around the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.g003
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the effect of the age group also tended to be significant, F(3, 120) = 2.35, p = .08, ηp2 = .06. Accu-
racy was lower in the 50–64 year-olds compared to the 18–34 year-olds, p< .01.
In sum, for the reality-unknown belief reasoning task, global performance did not differ
according to the socio-educational level. The global performance did not differ according to
the gender of participants, except for one age group. Accuracy significantly decreased with
age, especially in men and for the FB trials. Finally, accuracy was lower for FB trials compared
to all the others trials as shown in Fig 4.
For the reality-known belief reasoning task, neither the main effect of gender, F(1, 108) < 1,
p> .10, the main effect of socio-educational level, F(1, 108) < 1, p> .10, nor the main effect of
age group, F(3, 108) < 1, p> .10, were significant. All the double and triple interactions
involving the gender, the age group and/or the socio-educational level did not reach the statis-
tical level of significance (all ps>. 10). The main effect of the type of trials (FB vs. TB/MC vs.
Filler) was not significant either, F(1.60, 172.27) = 2.342, p = .111, and did not interact with the
gender, the socio-educational level, the age group or any combination of these variables (all
ps > .10). In sum, performance in the reality-known belief reasoning task did not vary signifi-
cantly according the age, the gender, the socio-educational level or the type of trials.
Finally, we tested the relative complexity of the two belief reasoning tasks by running an
ANOVA on the percentage of correct responses on the FB trials with the task (reality-unknown
vs. known) as a repeated factor and the age group, the gender and the socio-educational level as
Fig 4. Percentage of correct responses as a function of age group and type of trials for the reality-unknown belief reasoning task. The error bars represent the
confidence intervals 95% around the mean, they were corrected for repeated measures by age group according the Cousineau method [68]. FB = false belief trials,
TB = true belief trials, Control = control trials (including memory control and Filler trials).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.g004
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between-participant factors. Regarding the between-participant factors, the main effect of age
was significant, F(3, 108) = 3.57, p = .02, ηp2 = .09, while the main effect of gender and the main
effect of socio-educational level were not significant, both Fs(1, 108)< 1, p> .10. The two-way
and the three-way interactions were not significant [age  gender: F(3, 108) = 1.11, p>. 10; age 
socio-educational level: F(3, 108)< 1, p> .10; gender  socio-educational level: F(3, 108)< 1,
p> .10; age  gender  socio-educational level: F(3, 108)< 1, p> .10] Regarding the repeated
factor and its interaction with the between-participant factors, the main effect of the task was
significant, F(1, 108) = 59.35, p< .01, ηp2 = .35, with accuracy being lower in the reality-un-
known FB trials (M = 88.2%, SD = 16.4%) than in the reality-known FB trials (M = 98.6%,
SD = 5.1%). This effect did not interact neither with gender nor with socio-educational level,
both Fs(1, 108)< 1, p> .10, while it significantly interacted with age, F(3, 108) = 4.75, p< .01,
ηp
2 = .12. This two-way interaction was qualified by a significant three way interaction between
the task, the age group and the gender, F(3, 108) = 2.78, p = .045, ηp2 = .07. This interaction was
explained by the fact that the effect of the task was significant in each age group in women and
men (all ps< .05), except in 35–49 year-old men for which there was no significant difference
between the two tasks (floor effect: 99.11 vs 98.2%), t(13) = 1.00, p> .10. All other three-way
interactions and the four-way interaction were not significant, all Fs< 1, p>. 10. In sum, these
results showed a greater complexity of the reality-unknown FB trials compared to the reality-
known FB trials that was showed in all age groups of men and women, except in 35–49 year-old
men due to a floor effect.
Altogether, these results showed an effect of age on performance on the reality-unknown
especially on FB trials that were also less accurately performed compared to the true belief tri-
als and the control trials, a very limited effect of the gender with significant differences being
limited to a specific age group, and a greater complexity of the reality-unknown FB trials com-
pared to the reality-known FB trials that was showed in all age groups of men and women,
with only one exception.
Based on these results, only the distribution of the participants according to age group was
maintained for the calculation of the norms for the two false belief reasoning tasks. For each
trial type, the mean and the standard deviation of the control participants by age group was
calculated. The cut-off (threshold values to establish that a score is pathological and are based
on the score that is 2 standard deviation away from the mean performance of the control par-
ticipants) are presented in Tables 5–7. The detailed procedure to calculate the cut-off scores
for each type of trial is explained below each table.
Brain-damaged patients
For each patient, the scores for the different categories of trials were calculated and compared
with the norms of age-matched control participants according the classification method
described above. The results showed overall a diversity in the profiles of the patients’ perfor-
mance in the false belief reasoning tasks (cf. Table 9). Overall, 3 out of the 21 brain-damaged
patients showed impaired self-perspective inhibition processes while 14 had spared self-per-
spective inhibition processes. Furthermore, 2 out of the 21 brain-damaged patients showed
impaired spontaneous other-perspective-taking while 12 showed spared abilities to spontane-
ously take into account the other person’s perspective. Then, 3 out of the 21 brain-damaged
patients showed equivalent levels of belief reasoning impairment in both tasks which may indi-
cate either that both processes were impaired or that another process common to both tasks
was impaired (such as the knowledge about nature of beliefs). However, further clinical exami-
nation consisted to administrate to these three patients another ToM task with lower sponta-
neous other perspective taking demands and lower self-perspective inhibition demands. The
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Table 9. Demographics data, performances and classification of the brain-damaged patients (n = 21) at the two false belief reasoning tasks.
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performance observed on that additional task allowed us to exclude semantic difficulties for
two out of the three patients (since these two patients showed a preserved performance on the
belief inference trials of the task). However, the remaining patient was also impaired in this
Table 9. (Continued)
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W = woman, M = man, DAT = degenerative dementia of Alzheimer’s type, % corr = % of correct responses, FB = false belief, TB = true belief, TB/MC = true belief/
memory control, control trials include MC + filler for the Reality-unknown task or TB/MC + filler trials for the Reality-known task, n/a = not-applicable
a patients who also participated in the study by Biervoye et al. [20]
b patients who are also participated in another study (Biervoye et al., in preparation).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295.t009
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additional task specifically for beliefs; in that latter case, one can suspect that the patient had
probably impaired semantic knowledge about beliefs. Finally, for a few patients, the integrity
of these two core ToM processes could not be established either because the patients had diffi-
culties processing the input information, because their profile of response suggested the use of
a superficial strategy.
Discussion
The two belief reasoning tasks used in this study were previously used in the literature to dem-
onstrate the separability of two belief reasoning sub-processes: self-perspective inhibition and
spontaneous other-perspective inference [17, 54–55]. The aim of this study was to adapt these
two tasks for clinical purposes by collecting normative data and standardizing a diagnostic
procedure. The results highlighted three important findings. First, the results obtained from
the normative data collection showed a decrease in performance in one of the tasks as a func-
tion of age, namely the task that loaded most on spontaneous other-perspective inference
demands. Secondly, for healthy participants, gender and socio-educational level had little to
no impact in the two tasks. Thirdly, the use of the proposed standardized diagnostic procedure
with brain damaged patients showed considerable heterogeneity in the integrity of the two tar-
geted ToM processes following acquired brain damage. These results are discussed below.
The effect of normal ageing and other demographic variables on false belief
reasoning
Most previous studies which investigated the effects of age on ToM performance (including
belief reasoning) came to the conclusion that performance decreases as age increases (e.g., [57,
69–70]. However, the results are not so clear-cut since some studies found no effect of age [71–
72] or even a better performance as age increases [73]. These conflicting results have been
explained in terms of methodological differences (tasks used, variability of the individuals’
characteristics, etc.). Nevertheless, recent meta-analyses support the notion of an overall
decrease in ToM abilities with age (e.g., [34–74]) and our data is consistent with this general
finding.
One of the main questions debated is whether such age effect on ToM performance is
linked to a deterioration of general cognitive processes or to a deterioration of processes spe-
cific to ToM. On the one hand, some authors have shown that the decrease of performance in
ToM tasks as a function of age is mainly observed in complex ToM tasks (such as for example,
second-order false belief reasoning tasks) but not in simple ToM tasks (such as first-order false
belief reasoning tasks) [69]. It has been thus proposed that older individuals do not have spe-
cific impairments in ToM but rather difficulties with the general cognitive resources required
to solve complex ToM tasks [69–75]. Furthermore, some authors have shown that the decrease
of ToM performance with age was mediated by alterations to general cognitive processes such
as executive functions and speed of processing (e.g., [76–79]), updating information in work-
ing memory [70–72], logical reasoning and vocabulary level [76]), further supporting the idea
that the ToM problems observed in older adults is in fact secondary to a general cognitive
decline.
On the other hand, other authors have compared older adults’ peformance on ToM trials/
tasks with closely matched control trials/tasks with as sole difference that control trials/tasks
did not require mentalizing and found a larger age effect on the ToM trials/tasks [57, 70, 78]
(for a recent meta-analysis, see also [34]), suggesting that the deterioration of ToM perfor-
mance with age is due to genuine ToM difficulties rather than being secondary to a more gen-
eral cognitive decline.
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In our study, we found an effect of age on the false belief trials of the reality-unknown belief
reasoning task but not on the false belief trials of the reality-known task. Irrespective of age,
the false belief trials of the reality unknown-task were harder, indicating that the effect of age
was observed in the most challenging belief reasoning condition. However, the effect of age
was not significant on any of the control trials. This indicates that the older adults in our study
were sensitive to the complexity of ToM reasoning rather than just sensitive to the complexity
of the general task demands.
Few studies have investigated whether age affects different types of ToM process in the
same way, especially as far as belief reasoning processes are concerned. One study used the
same tasks as the ones we used in our study (but the long instead of the short version; [57])
and found that the older participants had lower performances than the younger participants
only for the false belief trials in the reality-known task. The authors concluded that age affects
selectively the ability to inhibit one’s own perspective. Our results do not fit with this profile of
performance and interpretation as we found the opposite: an effect of age on the false trials of
the reality-unknown task only, suggestive of a selective age effect on the ability to spontane-
ously track other people’s beliefs. These conflicting results could be explained by two methodo-
logical factors. Firstly, in both studies the analyses were performed at the group level. It is
possible that the performance at the group level mask a high inter-individual variability in
terms of which process is deteriorating. Different samplings of volunteers may thus lead to dif-
ferent patterns at the group level depending on the diversity of profiles in the sample. Sec-
ondly, these authors [57] have administrated the two tasks in the reverse order to our fixed
order. In our study, the reality-unknown task was always presented before the reality-known
task. In contrast, in the study by Bailey and Henry [57], the tasks were presented in two ses-
sions and each session started with a block of trials of the reality-known task before presenting
a block of the reality-unknown task. Given that the reality-known trials are presented before
reality-unknown trials, once participants are presented with reality-unknown trials, they are
likely to be primed by the « reality-known » task instruction (which is the task with the most
explicit mentalizing instructions) to pay attention to the woman’s belief. Thus, the demands in
spontaneous other-perspective inference could have been reduced in the study by Bailey and
Henry [57]. Future studies will need to disentangle these as well as other potential reasons for
the discrepant results.
Our analyses showed no significant effect of gender and socio-educational level on the two
belief reasoning tasks. No effect of these variables was also observed on a verbal belief reason-
ing task in another study [28]. In the literature, the effect of gender in social cognition has
mainly been investigated in relation to empathy and the results are not always consistent [35,
38]. Eisenberg and Lennon [38] explained that the effect of gender was mainly reported with
self-reported measures (questionnaires) but not with direct measures (behavioral tasks), such
as the ones employed here.
Implication for models of cognitive theory of mind and clinical practice
Our results with a sample of brain damaged patients demonstrated a diversity of profiles in
belief reasoning: some patients presenting with an impairment in self-perspective inhibition
but not spontaneous other-perspective inference; others showed the reverse pattern; and in
some cases, both processes were likely to be impaired. These results support the idea that ToM
is not a unitary function [11,13] and more specifically that self-perspective inhibition and the
spontaneous inference of other-perspective are sustained by distinct cognitive processes that
can be selectively affected by brain damage to the right lateral prefrontal cortex in case of a
selective deficit in self-perspective inhibition [17–19] and damage to the left posterior
Assessing belief reasoning deficits
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190295 January 30, 2018 23 / 29
temporo-parietal junction in the case of a selective deficit in spontaneous other-perspective
tracking [19–20,55].The separability of these two cognitive processes underlying ToM is also
consistent with neuroimaging studies in healthy participants which have shown that self-per-
spective inhibition is sustained by the right lateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., [50–52]). Neuroim-
aging studies in healthy participants have yet to confirm the implication of the left temporo-
parietal junction in spontaneous other-perspective tracking.
The observation of the heterogeneity in the patients’ performance also confirms the need to
envisage rehabilitation programs that are tailored to the patients’ specific profiles. Little is
known so far on the rehabilitation “ingredients” that make a program efficient. The diversity
of profiles observed should prompt researchers to investigate the most effective exercises to
restore or compensate for the impaired processes and it is highly likely that such exercises will
differ in nature depending on the type of impairment. In some cases, the profile of the patient
indicates that he or she has difficulties in processing the input information to belief reasoning.
Rather than seeing this as an artefact of our tasks, we suggest that this could translate into diffi-
culties processing the input to ToM reasoning in everyday life since most social interactions
require integration of various pieces of information. For those patients, focusing first the reha-
bilitation on the general cognitive processes impaired rather than on belief reasoning could be
more appropriate. Once the general cognitive resources have improved, the re-assessing of the
belief reasoning abilities could then indicate whether impairments specific to belief reasoning
exist and need to be taken care of.
It would be interesting to further examine the extent to which the impairment in self-per-
spective inhibition or spontaneous other-perspective tracking affects the reasoning about
other mental states than beliefs. So far, the results suggest that self-perspective inhibition defi-
cits reported in the type of belief reasoning tasks reported here extend to desire, emotion and
visual perspective reasoning [19–20]. It is also important to note that the usefulness of the two
belief reasoning tasks presented here is not limited to a population of patients with acquired
brain damage but extends to other clinical populations with psychiatry (such as schizophrenia
for example), developmental disorders (such as autism for example) or even populations of
healthy children and adolescents. In particular, the analysis of the individual rather than the
group profile may provide a much richer understanding of how ToM can be affected in those
disorders. For example, using the same tasks and a similar diagnostic approach as the one
described here, Maurage et collaborators [59] showed that while at the group level individuals
with alcohol dependence show impaired ToM performance in both belief reasoning tasks,
when looking at the individual profiles, only half of the sample showed a belief reasoning
impairment. Furthermore, alcohol dependent individuals could either show an impairment in
self-perspective inhibition or an impairment in tracking the other-perspective spontaneously,
highlighting the potential limits of global and undifferentiated rehabilitation programs for
these types of patients.
Finally, it is important to remind potential users of these tasks that clinical observations
play an important role in refining the diagnosis based on the general three-step diagnostic
approach.
Limitations
Although the tasks presented here are very promising for providing a more fine-grained diag-
nosis of belief reasoning deficits, the study has some limitations. A first limitation concerns the
impossibility to test some psychometric criteria of the tasks, such as their reliability and valid-
ity. The reliability of a task is measured by the stability of the results over time (“test-retest reli-
ability”). Like with some tests assessing executive functions, this procedure is not feasible for
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our belief reasoning tasks. Indeed, administrating our tasks twice would strongly reduce the
novelty feature inherent to the « reality-unknown » task and thereby reduce the demands in
spontaneous other-belief tracking on the second presentation of the task. Assessing the con-
vergent validity of our tasks involves comparing the performances of participants on these
belief reasoning tasks with their performances obtained in another well-established test evalu-
ating the same process. However, other ToM tasks used in the literature do not tax self-per-
spective inhibition and the spontaneous inference of others’ belief in the same way as our
tasks.
A second limitation relates to the age limit of the participants (74 years). Future work
should extend the normative data collection to older participants. Such extension would
require most probably a larger number of healthy participants (given the possible greater het-
erogeneity of age effects) and stricter inclusion / exclusion criteria (to take into account the
greater likelihood of neurodegenerative diseases as age increases).
Conclusions
In sum, the present study describes the rationale and the normative data collection of two non-
verbal tasks to assess the integrity and disentangle the cognitive processes involved in belief
reasoning (i.e., self-perspective inhibition vs. spontaneous other-perspective inference). Data
collected in healthy participants showed a deleterious effect of age in the performances of one
of the tasks indicative of a possible larger effect of age on the ability to spontaneously track
other people’s beliefs. The novel diagnostic procedure was applied to 21 brain-damaged
patients and showed a diversity of profiles, including selective deficits. This latter finding
shows the importance of taking into account the multiple facets of ToM during the diagnosis
and rehabilitation of patients with suspected ToM deficits.
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